to high-ihcome groups thus reducing the government's cost. In Morocco, food subsidies represented 10 percent of current government expenditures in the early 1980s. Although the percentage has diminished in recent years as prices of subsidized imported foods have fallen, a continuing economic crisis has caused the government to embark on a policy of gradually eliminating the subsidies. Subsidies on meat, butter, and other dairy products have been removed since the late 1970s, but attempts to increase prices for the most important staples (soft wheat, vegetable oil, and sugar powder) have been vehemently opposed by the media and have ignited street riots. Subsidies on these commodities are still in place.
This study investigates the potential effects of removing the remaining subsidies in Morocco. The three criteria used to evaluate the price reform are its effect on real income across income groups; on calorie consumption; and on the government.
The method used to evaluate the effect of a food price rise on real income is first described. But for those at the bottom of the income distribution, it is the commensurate declines in consumption that are of concern, as consumption levels could fall below some minimal nutritional requirement. Thus I also explain how induced caloric changes are estimated. Aggregate effects on the government budget will depend on the price and income elasticities of demand for the food products involved. Calculating income elasticities is generally easy, but calculating price elasticities is not-because of the lack of reliable timeseries data in developing countries. Nonetheless, many countries have budget surveys of good quality. These surveys do not report on prices but observations on expenditure levels and quantities demanded can be used to estimate price elasticities (Deaton 1988) . I apply Deaton's technique to the Moroccan case. The empirical results are then presented including the consequences of a move to subsidies on two inferior foods. The results suggest that such a program could reduce both the budgetary burden and the costs to the poor.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ANALYSIS OF PRICE REFORM
The Welfare Effects A price increase reduces purchasing power and therefore real income (all else equal). The effect of a price reform on consumers' welfare can be calculated by estimating the minimum amount of income by which a consumer must be compensated after a price increase to be as well-off after the change as before. This can be computed by use of Hicks's (1956) compensating variation (CV) index (see Varian 1984) . 1 follow the approach adopted by Braverman, Hammer, and Ahn (1987) . The welfare effect of a price change from p° to pl is defined as
is the cost of living for a household at a set level of welfare or utility, u°, (the relevant measure of real income), and qi is the Hicksian demand for i-it is calculated based only on substitution in response to changes in relative prices. It does not allow for changes induced by the reduction in real income as subsidies are removed. In percentage terms, the effect of a price change on real income is
6 log c(u,P)/(6 log pi) = (1/c) (piq,).
Hence, the percentage change in the cost of living resulting from price reform is
where W is a vector of the percentage shares of each good i in total household expenditures and P is a vector of percentage price changes. It shows that the higher the share of a good in total expenditures, the bigger the effect on real income of an increase in the price of that commodity. Because the poor spend a higher proportion of their income on food, food price increases can have significant negative effects on the welfare of low-income groups.
The Nutritional Effects
The estimates of the income effects of price reform will not indicate when a decline in real income may push a household below some nutritional threshold, under which nutritional deficiencies or starvation occur. In this study, calorie consumption is used as a proxy for nutritional status (although the effects on intake of protein or other nutrients could be estimated using the same methodology).
The calorie intake of each household depends on the quantities consumed and the per unit calorie content of the commodities. Consumers respond to a rise in the price of commodity i by reducing their consumption of it and its complements and by increasing the consumption of its substitutes. The nutritional effect thus depends on the net effect of the calories lost by decreasing the consumption of i and its complements and gained by increasing the consumption of the substitutes of i.
The elasticity of calories demanded (Qj) with respect to the price of good i is
where sj is the share of commodity j in total calories consumed and efi is the price elasticity of demand for good j with respect to i. The percentage effect of a change in the prices of goods i on calories consumed is then
Equations 4 and 5 show that the nutritional effect of a price change depends on the signs and magnitudes of the price elasticities of demand (which goods are complements and which are substitutes and to what extent) and on the calorie contents of all the commodities consumed. If a commodity has a high share in caloric consumption, an increase in the price of the commodity can have negative nutritional effects unless cheaper but nutritionally rich substitutes are available. For the same reason, the price elasticity of demand for calories need not be negative (see Sahn 1988) .
The Budgetary Effects
Calculating the budgetary effects of total elimination of all food subsidies is straightforward, but estimates for relative changes in subsidies require accounting for the substitution of demand between goods as relative prices change at the aggregate level. While demand elasticities can be derived from household surveys, accurate aggregation to the level of total government budgets from such microeconomic sources is not possible (see Theil 1954 and Deaton and Muellbauer 1984 for a discussion of "the aggregation problem").
The budgetary cost, B, of subsidies on N goods is simply the sum of each subsidy, s., times the quantity of good n demanded, Qn:
(6) B 
=>S,Qn
where S, = pm -ps and p-' is the market price and ps is the subsidized price.
If a good is taxed, then s, < 0, that is, the subsidy is negative. If prices change, the change in Q. is
can be written in terms of elasticities as: (7') dQn/Qn = X enj (dp,/pj) i where en, is the cross-price elasticity of demand for n with respect to j. Note that dQn incorporates the substitution effects of the simultaneous change in prices. The effect of the price changes on the budget is then
The relationship in equation 8 can be computed without observations on the aggregate demand levels (Qn) of the commodities currently subsidized. The term snQn lB is the share of commodity n in the subsidies' budget. However, to estimate the budgetary effect of a subsidy on a commodity that is currently not subsidized, it is necessary to estimate the aggregate demand level of the commodity (Qg) and the level of the subsidy (sg). Equation 8 becomes
where X is the right-hand side expression in 8 and dsgQg/B is the share of the subsidy on the new good (g) in the total budget (B).
Estimating Price Elasticities without Price Data
Each of the analytical approaches above relies on the calculation of price elasticities. The welfare, nutritional, and budgetary effects are based on the change in quantities, qi, as consumers substitute between goods in response to price reform. Price elasticities of demand depend on consumer preferences, incomes, and the extent of complements and substitutes in consumption. Substitution effects figure prominently in this study because we wish to identify replacements for currently subsidized goods which are nutritionally similar or superior but are inferior in preferences. If the current subsidies were removed and subsidies adopted for inferior goods, a smaller proportion of the nonpoor would benefit from the program-those with higher incomes would be less likely to purchase the inferior good than is the case with normal foods.
For most studies of these issues in developing countries, reliable price data are not available over a sufficient period to calculate these elasticities. When faced with very little price data, researchers in the 1970s commonly used linear expenditure systems (LESS) to compute own-and cross-price elasticities (see Betancourt 1971; Lluch, Powell, and Williams 1977) . LESS impose the substitution effects, however, and assume that all goods are normal (Deaton and Muellbauer 1984) . Thus the LES is not appropriate for our purposes, and a flexible form for the demand system is needed.
I use a modified version of Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System. Because prices are not available, I follow Deaton (1988 Deaton ( , 1989 and compute unit values as the ratio of expenditures to quantities consumed. The unit values can be used as substitutes for prices if correction is made for the measurement error and the quality choice inherent in the values. (This process and the algebraic formulation of the algorithm to estimate equations 9 and 10 are given in Deaton 1988; an explanation and application to the Thai rice subsidy program is given in Deaton 1989.) I estimate equations for the share of good i in total food consumption, wi, and for log unit values, vi as:
where P is the vector of (unobserved) prices,' X is income (defined as total food consumption), and S is a vector of sociodemographic variables reflecting sector, gender, and age (given in Laraki 1988 ).
The use of total food consumption rather than income as an explanatory variable implicitly assumes a two-step budgeting process: first, households decide on how to divide their budget over food and nonfood items; second, they divide the total food budget over detailed food items. The advantage of this approach is that it keeps the model to be estimated relatively simple, since nonfood items can be ignored. In theory this assumption may lead to an overestimation of the real income effects of food price reform. However, since the substitutability of food and nonfood items is likely to be small, this upward bias is probably negligible.
I use total food consumption rather than total food expenditures in order to take into account the importance of own consumption in the rural sector and the phenomenon of food transfers from the rich to the poor. Total food consumption is defined as food expenditures plus the value of own consumption plus the net value of food gifts given and received. As in the literature, I treat these variables as exogenous (see, for example, Deaton 1989 ). There are no data on unearned income or any other farm assets with which one could instrument total food consumption.
The equations are estimated for the goods currently subsidized (soft wheat, vegetable oil, and sugar powder) and for the potential inferior goods (hard wheat and barley). Although not subsidized, sugar loaf and olive oil are also included to investigate their substitutability with sugar powder and vegetable oil, respectively. The survey does not distinguish between the two kinds of soft wheat flour, one more refined than the other, that are subsidized.
II. ESTIMATION RESULTS

The Price and Income Elasticities
The 1984-85 household expenditure survey that we use to estimate price and income elasticities is described in section I. Food budget shares are presented in appendix table A-1.
The estimates of income and quality elasticities presented in table 1 show that soft wheat is inferior in the rural sector but not in the urban sector. The opposite holds true for hard wheat. Consumer preferences have switched from hard wheat to soft wheat, and hard wheat is now economically inferior in urban areas. In rural areas, however, a long-standing policy of low soft wheat prices and high hard wheat prices induces farmers (in particular, smallholders with cash-flow problems) to produce hard wheat as a cash crop and buy soft wheat for consumption. Only large landholders can afford to consume hard wheat. Although not inferior, barley is a necessary good (its income elasticity is between zero and one) in the rural sector. 2 The quality effects (the effect of income on unit values) vary between 0 (as would be expected for homogeneous commodities) and 0.15 (for heterogeneous commodities). Soft wheat is a rather homogeneous product relative to hard wheat and has a quality elasticity three times lower than that of hard wheat in the urban sector. Although low, the quality elasticity of soft wheat is significant because the analysis does not distinguish between the two kinds of soft wheat flour. The highly refined flour is consumed by high-income households, whereas the lesser quality flour is consumed by low-income households.
The own-price elasticities (tables 2 and 3) are high for vegetable oil (in the rural and urban sectors) and sugar powder (in the urban sector). Thus price 2. Surprisingly, barley appears as a luxury item in urban areas. This could be due to the small number of households in the urban sample that report positive levels of barley consumption. The high income elasticity could be an anomaly of the data and should be interpreted with care. increases for these commodities can result in substantial savings in government budgets but also in large nutritional losses because high price elasticities imply a large decrease in the quantities consumed and hence lower caloric consumption. Hard wheat and barley are substitutes for soft wheat in the urban sector (table 1), but in the rural sector, although barley is a substitute for soft wheat, soft wheat and hard wheat are complements (table 3) .
Estimation of Nutritional, Welfare, and Budgetary Effects
Nutritional effects. Average per capita food intake is adequate in Morocco, and evidence of severe malnutrition is limited. Recent anthropometric data on preschool children, however, show that mild levels of undernourishment are pervasive. In urban areas, an estimated 25 percent of the children were "stunted" (exhibit low height for age), while 15 percent were underweight. The figures in rural areas are worse: 30 and 20 percent, respectively. Thus, while discussing alternative food subsidy policies, the nutritional impact of such policies should be of main concern.
The demand equations are specified for seven goods with their share in total food expenditures shown in appendix table A-1. This does not allow for substitutability with "all other food," and thus these estimates must be seen as upper bounds. A 50 percent increase in the prices of the three subsidized commodities (scenario 1) reduces caloric consumption by about 20 percent in the rural sector and between 7 percent (for the highest-income decile) and 12 percent (for the lowest-income decile) in the urban sector (table 4). Urban households are less affected than rural households because they react to the price increase in soft wheat by substituting hard wheat (a nutritionally rich commodity), whereas rural households react by substituting barley (a nutritionally poor commodity). A subsidy on barley (scenario 3) cannot compensate low-income groups in the rural sector for nutritional losses caused by a cut in current subsidies, as it will induce movement out of soft wheat consumption and into barley, resulting in significant nutritional losses. 3 A subsidy on hard wheat (scenario 3' ) does compensate low-income groups in the urban sector. If the subsidy on soft wheat is kept and only the prices of vegetable oil and sugar powder are increased (scenario 2), the nutritional effects are much smaller. They range from -4 percent for the poorest group to -9 percent for the richest group in the rural sector and between -4 percent and -6.7 percent for the same groups in the urban sector. Since most cases of nutritional deficiencies are found among low-income groups in rural areas, if the subsidies were eliminated these nutritional losses would further aggravate the malnutrition problem, unless compensating measures are taken for the poor.
Welfare effects. Raising prices affects the real income of the poor more severely than that of the rich (table 5) . If the prices of the three subsidized 1.3 0.8 0.3 Scenarios 1 and 3' combined -5.1 -2.3 -1.2 Scenarios 2 and 3' combined -1.3 -1.0 -0.4 Note: Scenario 1: 50 percent increase in prices of all subsidized goods (soft wheat, vegetable oil, and sugar powder). Scenario 2: 50 percent increase in prices of vegetable oil and sugar powder (subsidy on soft wheat remains). Scenario 3: 50 percent decrease in price of barley (subsidy on barley). Scenario 3' 50 percent decrease in price of barley and hard wheat (subsidies on barley and hard wheat).
Source: Calculations based on data from Caisse de Compensation, a survey conducted by Ministere du Plan, an agency of the government of Morocco.
commodities are increased by 50 percent (scenario 1), the poorest 10 percent of rural households need to be compensated by 7.4 percent compared with only 1.9 percent for the richest 10 percent. In the urban sector, the compensation varies between 6.4 and 1.5 percent. Subsidies on barley in the rural sector (scenario 3) and on hard wheat and barley in the urban sector (scenario 3') mitigate these effects.
A policy reform that would almost fully compensate all groups for real income losses would combine (1) a 50 percent reduction in the subsidy on vegetable oil and sugar powder with (2) retention of the soft wheat subsidy and a 50 percent cut in the price of barley in the rural areas and in barley and hard wheat in the urban areas (scenarios 2 and 3/3' together).
Budgetary effects. Increasing the prices of the three subsidized commodities by 50 percent (scenario 1) is tantamount to eliminating the subsidies: subsidy expenditures decrease by 100 percent. The results also show the leakage of the current subsidy system. Eliminating the subsidies (scenario 1) results in welfare losses of 7.4 percent for the rural poor versus 1.9 percent for the rich, and 6.4 versus 1.5 for the urban poor and rich. But in absolute terms, these percentages mean losses of DH 181 and DH 746 in the rural sector and DH 285 and DH 1053 in the urban sector. The subsidies have given an increase in real income to the rich that is four times higher than that gained by the poor, although in relative terms the poor would be hurt more by their elimination than would the rich.
If the subsidy on soft wheat remains while the prices of vegetable oil and sugar powder are increased by 50 percent (scenario 2), the budgetary expenditures are reduced by 35 percent. This is a realistic scenario and could be tantamount to the total elimination of the subsidies. Black market prices are widespread in the soft wheat market, and the middlemen and millers benefit from the subsidy, not the consumers (Laraki 1988) . If the subsidy on soft wheat is lifted, it may not affect consumers if the resulting soft wheat market price does not exceed current black market prices. When combined with subsidies on barley and/or hard wheat, the scenario has negligible effects on the welfare and nutritional status of the poor.
This indicates that a total removal of current subsidies combined with a new subsidy on a blend of barley and hard wheat flour (scenarios 1 and 3/3' combined) could result in a substantial saving to the government. 4 The saving would result because the poor consume hard wheat and barley more than soft wheat. A subsidy on a blend of hard wheat and barley must thus be cheaper than a subsidy on soft wheat.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This study illustrates a crucial dilemma inherent in nontargeted food subsidy programs. Because inferior goods are seldom subsidized, the benefits of these programs leak extensively to high-income households. This raises the cost of the programs. At the same time, low-income households tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on food than do high-income households. Any food price increases provoke negative welfare effects and substantial nutritional losses for poor households. This pattern accords with the findings for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Uganda (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988).
Simulations of various price policy reforms reveal that in Morocco, lowincome households can be partially compensated for the negative welfare effects of price increases by subsidies on inferior goods: barley in the rural areas and hard wheat in the cities. However, the two sectors are not totally isolated from one another. Because hard wheat is a luxury item in the rural sector, a subsidy on the commodity in urban areas can benefit high-income groups in rural areas. To avoid this problem it might be more appropriate to subsidize a flour (but not the grain) composed of hard wheat, barley, and any other grains giving the flour a dark color (dark baked products are inferior in Morocco). A marketing study could determine the feasibility of this solution. Import prices of grain and vegetable oil are now low. The time is ripe to remove current subsidies and to develop a low-priced "inferior" flour. This would decrease the cost of the subsidies without hurting the poor.
Morocco has accumulated large stocks of barley during the last few years, and the government is seriously considering a subsidy on it. To help barley producers, who are generally small farmers located in poor regions, the government has been bearing the storage costs of the surplus barley. It would be highly beneficial to the government, to consumers, and to barley producers to sell the surplus barley for consumption. Barley flour currently in stock could be sold at a price 25 percent lower than that of soft wheat flour, at no cost to the government, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (estimates of 1987). While barley is nutritionally poorer than soft wheat, if a barley flour is cheap enough, consumers could determine the appropriate mix between expensive soft wheat flour and barley flour.
I have ignored the income effects on farmers and rural laborers that might result from food price increases. The negative income and welfare effects of the price increases could be reduced if the supply elasticities of Moroccan farmers were sufficiently high to increase the marketed surplus and the real income of rural households. Lack of data precludes estimation of such supply elasticities, however, so that I cannot determine whether the rural poor who sell food will be partially or fully compensated or whether they will gain from the price increases. Hence these conclusions are relevant only to consumers. Comprehensive analysis of the effects of food price reform in developing countries is often stymied by the lack of accurate and extensive price data. I have used Deaton's methodology for calculation of price elasticities from household budget surveys, which are the only source of reliable and detailed data for most developing countries. This article illustrates that welfare analysis of tax and price reform in developing countries is possible through the use of such elasticities in combination with welfare and nutritional indexes as developed here.
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